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Abstract: Much of the excitement in social media analytics revolves around, a) capturing 
large-scale collections of naturally-occurring talk, b) repurposing them as data, and, c) finding 
ways to speak sociologically about them. Researchers have raised concerns over the use of 
social media data in research (eg boyd and Crawford, 2012; Housley et al, 2014; Tinati et al, 
2014), exploring the ontological and epistemological grounding of the emerging field. We 
contribute to this debate by drawing on Wittgensteinian philosophy to elucidate hitherto 
neglected aspects; namely that it is not just social scientists who are in the business of analysing 
social media, but users themselves. We explore how mainstream social media analytics 
research (1) overinflates the importance of sociological theories, concepts and methodologies 
(which do not typically feature in the accounts of social media users), (2) downplays the extent 
to which social media platforms already exhibit order prior to any sociological accounting of 
them, and, (3) thereby produces findings which explain social scientific perspectives rather 
than the phenomena themselves. We reformulate the ontological and epistemological basis of 
social media analytics research from a Wittgensteinian perspective concerned with what it 
makes sense to say about social media, as members of society and as researchers studying those 
members. Such a project aims to explore social media users’ language as a practice embedded 
within the context of social life and online communication. This reflects the everyday use of 
language as an evolving toolkit for undertaking social interaction, pointing towards an 
alternative conception of social media analytics. 
Keywords: social media analytics; Big Data; ontology; epistemology; Wittgenstein; ordinary 
language philosophy; philosophy of social science. 
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What Would Wittgenstein Say About Social Media? 
Social media platforms are embedded in our cultural lives and are integral to how we think 
about social interaction. Because of this, and as part of a wider academic interest in ‘Big Data’, 
social researchers have increasingly engaged with social media platforms as vast collections of 
unscripted and unsolicited indicators of opinion and experience. Taking these collections as 
data has proven productive for researchers in the emerging field of social media analytics, who 
are increasingly able to use these data to explore issues pertinent to the traditional topical base 
of the social sciences (eg Baker and McEnery, 2015; Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015; Burnap et 
al, 2014; Currie et al, 2016). It has been to the field’s credit that researchers have already sought 
to work through the conceptual and methodological implications social media analytics has 
brought in its wake. This is exemplified by recent work on an array of foundational concepts 
for Big Data research and social media analytics (eg boyd and Crawford, 2012; Housley et al, 
2014; Tinati et al, 2014), where scholars seek to situate peoples’ data generation and usage 
practices within the social sciences’ theoretical, conceptual and methodological canon. 
We contribute to this materializing body of work by drawing on the Ordinary Language 
Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, 2009) to demonstrate different potential usages of 
social media data, and different questions to ask of them. This linkage between social media 
and Ordinary Language Philosophy belies an understanding of social media platforms as 
providing a (digitally-mediated) form of ‘speaking’. Taking Twitter as an exemplar case (cf 
Tufekci, 2014), we might note that a range of language-usages – things that people do with 
language – are captured by the platform. These include telling stories, sharing information, 
promoting an agenda, joking, arguing, critiquing, reflecting, promising, positing, 
propositioning, defining, redefining, correcting, rebutting, disproving, praising, aggrandising, 
supporting, advertising, downplaying, reporting, retracting, apologising, justifying, 
summarising, detailing, generalising, stereotyping, and so on. Whilst not wishing to delimit a 
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finite number of language-usages available to Twitter, this list serves as an example of how 
‘speaking’ (as a term and practice) is made up of constituent practices. It is such practices that 
form the topic of Ordinary Language Philosophy’s study (cf Coulter and Parsons (1990) on 
practices of ‘seeing’). 
The keystone of our argument is thus. Social scientists are enthused by the analysis of social 
media, and especially so in deriving concepts, theories and methodologies to undertake the 
work. However, it is important also to recognise that social media users themselves are 
undertaking similar analytical work in the course of their social media usage – in order to 
understand and communicate with others, both researchers and social media users alike must 
constantly analyse, interpret and react to the interactional materials they are presented with 
(whether they be verbalised words and body gestures or the text and images that may be found 
within a tweet). This is how social life operates generally and ubiquitously, whether 
experienced offline or online1. It is equally important to recognise that social media users do 
all this analytic work without requiring a theory of their behaviour, without employing 
conceptual frameworks to support it, and without leveraging methodological principles to 
uncover those things2. Hence, whilst social media users are engaged in mutual understandings 
of how everyday life plays out in online spaces, social media analytics research is ostensibly 
about a different project; namely to incorporate social media usage into its own conceptual 
lexica, so as to be able to speak sociologically about what people do online, post-hoc. We 
counterpoint recent (‘mainstream’) ontological and epistemological work in social media 
analytics with a Wittgenstein-influenced take on social media, which is less concerned with 
applying social science theories, concepts and methods to social media and instead elects to 
describe the orders and organisation that already exist. 
The paper proceeds as follows. We outline a key aspect of Wittgenstein’s Ordinary Language 
Philosophy (OLP): his antipathy towards the social sciences as a means of capturing language-
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use and interaction to express things about the world, and his concentration on ‘reminders’ and 
‘perspicuous representations’ as an alternative means to orient to these phenomena. We then 
summarise burgeoning ontological and epistemological work that seeks to lay the foundations 
for the ongoing development of social media analytics. Next, we evince OLP as an alternative 
to mainstream social media analytics ontological and epistemological thinking, arguing that by 
starting with a concern with the development and deployment of social science theories, 
concepts and methods mainstream approaches neglect to acknowledge the existing order and 
organisation that users bring to social media. As such, mainstream social science thereby 
produces findings which, we argue, herald insights primarily about their own approach than 
they do the phenomena they purport to explain. Though the approach is widespread throughout 
social media analytics, we demonstrate this by undertaking an OLP-oriented critique of two 
exemplar empirical studies of Twitter data (Heverin and Zach, 2012; Cha et al, 2010): first, in 
terms of how social science theory and concepts are leveraged to make (ontological) 
explanations of the world, and second, in terms of how those explanations are arrived at 
(epistemologically) through social science methods. This is followed by a more general 
discussion of OLP as a descriptive endeavour and the implications of this for mainstream social 
media analytics. We then return, in conclusion, to a Wittgensteinian concern with ‘what it 
makes sense to say’ about the multifarious usages of language-terms demonstrated through 
everyday social media usage. This, we posit, provides a different conceptualisation of social 
media analytics premised on descriptions of language-use as sets of practices embedded in 
social (and, in principle, online) contexts and which operate on the basis of a publically visible, 
witnessable and accountable order. Hence, the present paper contributes to social media 
analytics by exploring the potential for OLP to offer an innovative approach to the qualitative 
analysis of social media data. 
Wittgenstein’s Ordinary Language Philosophy (In Brief)3 
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Given that Wittgenstein scholars do not share a unified account of Wittgenstein’s thought, 
producing a definite statement on what Wittgenstein’s philosophy ‘is about’ is a somewhat 
perilous activity. Our reading will concentrate on the aspects of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
which justify a resistance against the appropriation of everyday language-use as materials by 
which to conceptualise social life. 
In Philosophical Investigations (2009), Wittgenstein takes the academy to task on the idea of 
a purely referential language, and on the ontological and epistemological claims that result 
from such a view. A purely referential language is where the meanings of words are determined 
by defining them as associative with things in the world; objects, mental states, theoretical 
entities, etc. Under this view, how the word ‘yellow’ comes to mean anything is through 
pointing to yellow objects, requiring learners to associate the utterance of the word with some 
property of the object (eg the colour). Though Wittgenstein did not deny that language can be 
referential, he contended that philosophical mistakes arise from the idea of language as always 
and only garnered from referentiality as a fixed method for building and using language. As 
Hanfling (2006) articulates, Wittgenstein’s rejection of an exclusively referential 
understanding of language is at least partially informed by a rejection of philosophy’s tendency 
to conflate everyday language terms with philosophical concepts. As Wittgenstein notes: 
‘When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, 
“proposition/sentence”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one 
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the 
language in which it is at home?’ (2009: §116) 
‘We [philosophers] take the possibility of comparison [between everyday and 
philosophical usages of words], which impresses us, as the perception of a 
highly general state of affairs.’ (2009: §104) 
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In this way, Wittgenstein argues that philosophers have become ‘dazzled’ (2009, §100) by the 
answers that everyday usages of language appear to offer to philosophical problems. This 
compulsion may be encouraged by a cultural fascination with scientific and logical 
explanation: 
‘Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and to answer questions in the way science does. 
This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads philosophers into 
complete darkness.’ (Wittgenstein, 1958: 18). 
Hence, an understanding of the use of language becomes exasperated by certain activities 
associated with academic practice. For instance, solitary reflection on a word leads us to 
consider it in isolation, removed from a context where it is used unproblematically, and 
obscuring the standards surrounding its usage (Wittgenstein, 2009: §38, §593). In short, we – 
philosophers and academics – become distracted by the meanings of words that are nearest to 
us in our own discipline-specific usages, forgetting that other different usages of the same word 
circulate elsewhere (ie in everyday life). 
To guard against such confusion, Wittgenstein advocates observing how language is used in 
everyday situations: 
‘Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to 
them all? – Don’t say: “They must have something in common, or they would 
not be called ‘games’” – but look and see whether there is anything common 
to all...Are they all ‘entertaining’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. 
Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think 
of patience.’ (2009: §66) 
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Hence, there are multiple different applications of the word ‘game’ which serve to resist a 
singular universal (ie scientific/logical) definition of what a game might be. Yet this does not 
upset how we deploy the term in our everyday life: as everyday people we know that 
professional football matches and rounds of Pac-Man are both legitimately describable as 
games. We are also unconcerned by the dissimilarities between the two activities which prevent 
the term ‘game’ from being a logical descriptor of a set of properties or qualities of games. 
Wittgenstein’s OLP orients readers towards precisely these situations where word-use is 
unproblematic – the messy ‘rough ground’ (2009: §107) of everyday practices – to see how 
language functions in the context of its usage: 
‘It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling 
‘that it is possible, contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ – 
whatever that may mean – could be of no interest to us... And we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must 
take its place. And this description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – 
from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; 
but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and 
that in such a way that these workings are recognized – despite an urge to 
misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new 
discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. 
Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the 
resources of our language.’ (2009: §109) 
Hence, Wittgenstein proffers no theory of language, and rejects the possibility of such a theory 
at all. Instead, he elects to show readers different aspects of language in situ to elicit 
understandings of the various ways in which language gets used. Wittgenstein does so via 
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‘reminding’ us (and encouraging us to remind ourselves) of the different usages of language-
terms already in circulation, and by providing ‘perspicuous representations’ of those cases. 
In our everyday language-use, we generally apply words correctly and unproblematically; as 
such, it can be illuminating to simply remind ourselves of the ways we use language terms, to 
recover the sense in which those terms have different uses in different contexts. Reminding is 
necessary, since we cannot give unified accounts of all applications and we need to ‘see’ them 
to understand the various manifestations: 
‘Something that one knows when nobody asks one, but no longer knows when 
one is asked to explain it, is something that has to be called to mind. (And it is 
obviously something which, for some reason, it is difficult to call to mind.)’ 
(Wittgenstein, 2009: §91) 
Building on this, Wittgenstein states a need to formulate these reminders as perspicuous 
representations, which should show examples of word use that are complete and at the same 
time open to review. It is the function of a language-term – what it is used to do – that makes a 
representation perspicuous, allowing us to compare and contrast the various uses a term may 
have. Working with language-terms in this way, we can isolate our deeply-held uses and see 
our motivation behind holding a certain view. We can ask: are we colouring particular examples 
of everyday language-use and social life with our philosophical/academic mindset, or are we 
describing them in such a way as to capture how they are embedded in the contexts in which 
they are given shape and meaning? This is how such examples provide perspicuous 
representation, and this is how perspicuous representations provide value in terms of 
understanding everyday life. 
Ontology, Epistemology, and the Foundations of Social Media Analytics 
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It is apposite at this point to connect Wittgenstein’s OLP with social media analytics, by 
exploring recent ontological and epistemological work in Big Data research. There have been 
concerns with the developmental direction of Big Data research and social media analytics 
since before research in the field had properly begun (see Savage and Burrows, 2007). These 
concerns have been formulated in a variety of studies seeking to work through the ontological 
and epistemological groundings of the field4. As Burrows and Savage note, the advent of Big 
Data research and social media analytics has made the time ripe to re-cover such questions: 
‘Big Data does challenge the predominant authority of sociologists and social scientists more 
generally to define the nature of social knowledge’ (Burrows and Savage, 2014: 5). For these 
reasons, ontology and epistemology have emerged as critical debates for the field. 
Ontological and epistemological5 studies within Big Data research and social media analytics 
represent an array of approaches, yet nonetheless display shared motivations around: a) 
capturing collections of naturally-occurring talk, opinions, attitudes and experiences on social 
media platforms, b) repurposing these collections as data to derive empirical insights, and c) 
finding ways to interpret those data by connecting them to existing social science concepts and 
theories. Throughout all three of these stages in the wider social media analytics strategy, 
ontological and epistemological thinking is evident. 
For instance, of the potential for using social media to capture collections of naturally-
occurring talk, opinions, attitudes and experiences, Housley et al note that ‘these technologies 
and their allied data have the potential to “digitally-remaster” classic questions about social 
organization, social change and the derivation of identity from collective life.’ (2014: 4). These 
collections, however, are not to be taken uncritically, and it is important to use data as a way 
to access the ontological and epistemological assumptions we are making when we draw them 
from their native environments. As Felt reminds us:  
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‘It is not enough to simply imagine social media posts as a “raw” artifact, 
separated from the systems that produced them. Researchers must consider the 
processes that produced them. Researchers must consider the processes that 
create a moment as well as the networks involved in the situation. This must 
extend to the algorithms utilized to present the data.’ (Felt, 2016: 6) 
Following data collection through to empirical insights requires an intermediary stage where 
methods and methodologies can be leveraged to realise collections of social media posts as 
research data. This process too has encapsulated various ontological and epistemological ideas 
for researchers. For instance, Edwards et al note that ‘Rather than regarding social media data 
analysis as a surrogate for traditional methods… the experience of digital social research to 
date suggests the need for an account of how it might augment, and be augmented by, 
traditional social research methods.’ (2013: 247). Rogers highlights the notion of ‘repurposing’ 
as particularly important here: 
‘Digital methods repurpose or build on top of the dominant devices of the 
medium, and in doing so make derivative works from the results, figuratively 
and literally. That is, the initial outputs may be the same as or similar to those 
from online devices, but they are seen or rendered in new light, turning what was 
once familiar – a page of engine results, a list of tweets in reverse chronological 
order, a collection of comments, or a set of interests from a social networking 
profile – into indicators and findings.’ (Rogers, 2013: 3) 
Researchers have also sought to connect such indicators and findings with existing social 
theories and concepts, thereby lending wider relevance to their empirical work as part of the 
broader social science research canon. As Kitchin states, ‘It is one thing to identify patterns; it 
is another to explain them. This requires social theory and deep contextual knowledge’ (2014: 
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8), and it has been argued that only ‘once these [empirical] advances have become more 
embedded and consolidated within theoretical frames’ (Cowls and Schroeder, 2015: 3) can 
social media analytics push social science into new domains. Murthy states exactly these aims 
at the outset of his recent work on Twitter: 
‘Although I examine the practice of social media through specific Twitter-
mediated events, this book’s emphasis is both explanatory and theoretical. 
Specifically, my prime aim is to better understand the meanings behind Twitter 
and similar social media through concise yet sophisticated interpretations of 
theories of media and communication’ (Murthy, 2013: xii) 
More recently, Lupton and others (eg Beer, 2016; Boellstorff, 2016) have sought to use 
arguments drawn from Science and Technology Studies to ‘identify and think through some of 
the ways in which sociocultural theory may contribute to understanding data practices’ (2016: 
1). In this way, social media analytics is integrating ever more closely with the wider 
sociological project within which it originates, by way of exploring how other sociological sub-
disciplines with similarly pertinent ontological and epistemological concerns have embraced 
those issues. 
An Ordinary Language Philosophy Take on Social Media Analytics 
Above, we have characterised social media analytics as, amongst other things, seeking to 
methodologically and epistemologically repurpose the naturally-occurring collections of online 
talk as data (cf Rogers, 2013) and to produce ontological claims about those collections by 
mapping them onto social science theories (cf Beer, 2016; Boellstorff, 2016; Cowls and 
Schroeder, 2015; Kitchin, 2014; Lupton, 2016). Yet seemingly despite the renewed focus on 
ontology and epistemology, these treatments of data simply demonstrate that it is possible to 
talk about social media with sociological terminology without providing a justification as to 
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what the value in doing so might be. Hence, with OLP in mind, we more carefully unpick what 
such studies claim of their data. Provocatively, we suggest there are grounds to read mainstream 
social media analytics studies as failing to account for their chosen subjects in a way that 
increases our understanding of those subjects. 
To concretise the concerns of OLP as an alternative to mainstream social media analytics 
research, we now present two cases of empirical studies of Twitter data to locate their respective 
mis-steps: one ontological (Heverin and Zach, 2012) and one epistemological (Cha et al, 2010). 
To illustrate our concerns we will focus on each of these two particular studies as exemplar 
cases, followed by brief descriptions of other studies where similar ontological or 
epistemological mistakes are evident to show how the problems pervade more generally across 
social media analytics. Our concern is not with the studies themselves, but their capacities as 
representative of the ontological and epistemological confusions that arise from mainstream 
social media analytics studies6. 
Ontology: A Mis-Step in the Use of Theory and Concepts 
Heverin and Zach (2012) study the usage of Twitter hashtags as a communication medium 
around three U.S. campus shootings. They describe the various different sorts of interactional 
work undertaken by users at different points along the course of each event: 
‘Through an analysis of the content of the microblogging communications 
sent via Twitter during three similar, violent crises, we found that 
information-sharing behaviors dominated the early response phase, also 
known as the critical period, of violent crises. We also found that opinion 
sharing increased considerably during the critical period and peaked in all 
three crises during the recovery phase.’ (2012: 34) 
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To situate these descriptions within the wider social science literary canon, Heverin and Zach 
draw on Dervin’s (1983) theory of collective sense-making, ‘defined as a process by which 
individuals attempt to bridge the cognitive gaps that they face in everyday life as well as during 
nonroutine times such as crises’ (2012: 34). For Heverin and Zach, the concept of sense-making 
explains the communicative practices described as an ontological claim about the world: 
‘Frameworks such as Dervin’s (1983) sense-making theory help provide a 
basis for understanding how individual behaviors can contribute to the sense-
making of others and expand the way in which we can look at microblogging 
communications by applying [a] user-centred approach to understanding 
information needs during crisis situations from the perspective of the 
individual actors’ (2012: 45) 
From the OLP perspective, the descriptive element of Heverin and Zach’s (2012) study – the 
investigation of how language is used in specific settings to do certain types of work – is where 
its value lies. However, Heverin and Zach make an ontological leap in their claim that the 
communicative practices they investigate constitute a demonstration of a theoretical construct 
(ie collective sense-making). Given this, it is a more compelling account of Heverin and Zach’s 
(2012) study that the conceptual orientation to sense-making is less explanatory of the 
communicative practices to which it is ostensibly applied, and more explanatory of the social 
scientific enterprise generally in that it demonstrates a commitment to producing concepts 
around the practices social scientists are in the business of observing. 
Similar ontological leaps are made by Cheung and To (2016) in their characterising of the social 
media interactions between consumers and corporations on social media via the theory of 
planned behaviour, by Ellison et al in their examination of Facebook users’ practices of 
mobilising help from their networks via “social capital conversions” (2013: 155) and by 
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Tufekci’s (2008) investigation of privacy on Facebook and Myspace through the lens of 
Altman’s theory of privacy as a process of optimization between self-disclosure and 
withdrawal. In all of these cases, it is unclear as to what subsequently explaining users’ practices 
in terms of their respective a priori theoretical commitments (and thereby abstracting the 
explanatory contribution of the study beyond the user-practices they purport to study) adds to 
our understanding of them. 
Epistemology: A Mis-Step in the Use of Methods and Methodologies 
Cha et al (2010) investigate the notion of ‘influence’ on Twitter – how it is exerted and 
responded to by others. They begin by noting Twitter as an area where our existing 
conceptualisation of influence does not apply neatly: 
‘The traditional influentials theory [where one person has influence and 
others connected to them are thereby influenced] has...been criticised because 
its information flow process does not take into account the role of ordinary 
users’ (2010: 11) 
Here, ordinary users are seen as having greater agency in exerting and responding to influence 
than in traditional models, which the authors deem more befitting the ‘viral’ nature of Twitter. 
To enable their investigation into influence, Cha et al (2010) make an epistemological leap to 
render peoples’ orientations to influence amenable to social scientific analysis. This is 
performed by the ‘datafication’ of influence into ‘three “interpersonal” activities on Twitter7 ... 
[which] represent the different types of influence of a person’ (Cha et al, 2010: 11-12), to be 
measured and explained via statistical analysis. 
The initial premise – Cha et al’s (2010) orientation to influence as consisting of communicative 
practices demonstrable within users tweets – is appealing. Descriptions of the ways in which 
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influence was performed and achieved by tweeters in practice would be highly illuminating. 
Yet it is the subsequent (epistemological) leap that we find problematic from the OLP 
perspective. In order to explore influence as a phenomenon, Cha et al (2010) reduce influence 
down to the three aforementioned metadata elements (ie followers, retweets and mentions). 
Hence, the study produces a statistical analysis of how these three modes of interaction correlate 
with one another, with findings indicating such things as tweeters who receive more retweets 
and mentions are more influential than those who simply have a higher number of followers. 
However, the repurposing of interactions into statistical variables taken to stand for ‘influence’ 
is an epistemological move that fails to increase our understanding of what influence is to the 
tweeters who exert and respond to it in the context of their everyday Twitter lives. Cha et al’s 
(2010) study promises an exploration of how influence is experienced by Twitter users, yet their 
epistemological work undermines the extent to which the study can capture users experiences 
of influence as being expressed through the language and contextual background of a tweet. 
Hence, we might rather see the analyses offered by Cha et al (2010) as being less about 
‘influence’ and more a demonstration of ‘datafication’ as a method of producing analyses of 
large volume social media data that accord with the traditional social science methodological 
toolkit. 
Such a move is apparent also in the work of Ceron et al (2014) who model political preference 
on Twitter with a semi-automated version of sentiment analytic metrics for linguistically coding 
large data corpora, in Huang et al’s (2013) characterisation of ‘online proximity’ (ie the feeling 
of closeness or distance from those we interact with online) as being measurable through space, 
time and homophily, and in Gilbert and Karahalios’ development of “tie strength” (2009: 212) 
as a means of using various interactions and metadata to measure relationships between 
Facebook users. However, as with Cha et al’s (2010) study, it is unclear as to what these 
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‘datafied’ analyses of digitally-mediated interactions might relate to and/or represent the 
phenomena they purport to be about. 
Discussion: Explanation and Description 
Given the negative problematising that OLP applies to mainstream social media analytics, it is 
important also to explore how OLP might be used positively in terms of providing researchers 
with an alternative entry point into social media. Here, we build on OLP’s affinity towards 
description (as opposed to explanation) as a means of understanding social life. The questions 
here are: what counts as an explanation of the things we (social media analysts) seek to 
understand about the world? And how can we access those explanations? As we have argued, 
social media analytics is currently exploring answers to these questions via ontological and 
epistemological moves. However, if our goal is to understand peoples’ practices when they use 
Twitter to communicate within specific contexts, then OLP reminds us that we would do well 
to concentrate, foremost, on producing descriptions of those activities.8 As Winch – an advocate 
of Wittgenstein’s OLP – suggests, description can provide an equally illuminating alternative 
to theoretical and conceptual explanation: 
‘Understanding is the goal of explanation and the end-product of successful 
explanation. But of course it does not follow that there is understanding only 
where there has been explanation; neither is this in fact true.’ (1990: x) 
This focus on description attunes us to peoples’ own accounts of the activities they are 
undertaking, and encourages us to think with clarity on how theirs and our descriptions do the 
work of describing (ie how we might recognise one activity as a particular kind of activity and 
not something else). Notably, it is a rare case where social theories and concepts might be found 
within everyday language use – as Hutchinson et al note: 
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‘It is not, first, for sociologists to decide what someone is properly said to be 
doing. The language they are using, after all, does not belong to them, but is one 
that they speak because they belong to the language communities about and 
within which they write: ‘washing hands’ isn’t a description that any sociologist 
has contrived, and it is indisputable that whether it is the correct thing to say or 
not should be decided by the way in which language works, is used, within the 
activities to which it belongs (to domestic affairs: clean those dirty hands!; to 
medical situations: ‘scrub up before surgery’; or to affairs of state: washing 
hands as the ceremonial way to rescue oneself).’ (2008: 77-78) 
Thus, to simply say that someone is ‘washing their hands’ without a sense of the context 
surrounding the statement provides only an incomplete description which immediately begs 
further questions – who is washing their hands, and why? It is precisely such context that lends 
any description of a given activity its intelligibility and its criteria for correct application. And 
it is the visibility of those contexts and criteria within language-use (eg using the term 
‘scrubbing up’ as a distinctively medicalised turn of phrase rather than just ‘washing my hands’) 
and social interaction (eg wearing green overalls and working in a hospital) which provide 
ample footing for researchers seeking to understand how social life is organised. 
Though not necessarily within the topical remit of social media analytics, several researchers 
in the fields of Human-Computer Interaction and Computer-Supported Cooperative Work have 
undertaken qualitative analyses that do attend to the everyday practices through which people 
generate and use digital data (eg Didžiokaitė et al, 2017; Brown et al, 2013; Brown et al, 2015; 
Licoppe et al, 2016; Reeves and Brown, 2016; Reeves et al, 2015; Rost et al, 2013) and these 
works provide insight into how we might put Wittgenstein’s ideas to practice. For instance, 
Rost et al (2013) examine users’ ‘check-in’ practices on Foursquare, Brown et al (2015) explore 
mobile internet searches as an activity jointly organised around information retrieval and 
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conversational interaction, and Licoppe et al (2016) analyse the conversational and interactional 
practices through which users establish matches on the gay dating app Grindr. All of these 
studies are premised, first and foremost, on deep descriptions of the interactions at hand. What 
these studies demonstrate is an attunement to the practical interactions that play out through 
and are afforded by digital platforms, as opposed to extracting those interactions out of their 
local contexts via ‘datafying’ them or analysing them according to their fit with sociological 
theories or concepts. 
Turning back now to social media analytics, we can see that researchers in this areas do not 
typically share this focus on producing descriptions grounded in the interactional contexts 
available through social media data, and this has led to ontological and epistemological mis-
steps. Taking our exemplar cases for instance, both Heverin and Zach (2012) and Cha et al 
(2010) allude to the possibility of describing the activities they take as their subjects in such a 
way, yet neither focus on description as the primary purpose of the study. Heverin and Zach 
(2012) downplay the descriptive element of tweeting practices around campus shooting events 
in favour of exploring how those activities might be explained with reference to “collective 
sense-making”. Cha et al (2010) set up the notion of influence in such a way as to make a 
descriptive account possible, yet neglect to undertake the descriptive work in favour of a 
‘datafied’ version of influence based on a small selection of tweeting practices. This connects 
back to Wittgenstein’s comments, outlined above, on language as not purely referential: the 
aforementioned researchers commit referential fallacies when they claim that social media 
users’ interactions map neatly onto the existing theory of collective-sense making (Heverin and 
Zach, 2012), and when they work from the assumption that social media users’ conception of 
‘influence’ is identical to the definition of ‘influence’ in social science research and has the 
capacity to be neatly encapsulated in a simplistic model based on the ‘datafication’ of three 
metrics (Cha et al, 2010). In making these referential fallacies, both studies produce 
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explanations, yet the ontological and epistemological work involved in producing those 
explanations gives grounds to question whether what they are explaining is the subjects they 
profess to study or the assumptions and methods that social media analytics employs to make 
sense of the world.  
As Wittgenstein might have it, both of these studies (and those listed alongside them) are 
dazzled by the idea that the everyday language captured in social media data can be used to 
produce direct answers to social scientific problems. However, social media analytics typically 
operates without acknowledging the effects of the translation of social media posts from 
‘everyday language’ to ‘data’ and ‘analyses’, ie where we typically undertake ontological and 
epistemological work to wrangle the phenomena at hand into shapes we can comfortably 
handle. This has been, in fact, a lingering promise of ‘Big Data’ research (as the substrate of 
social media analytics) for academia as well as in marketing, industry, policy and other sectors 
working in the emerging field: that new data sources and new computational techniques can 
afford quick, cheap, highly-reproducible, impactful, theoretically-informative and 
methodologically-innovative empirical findings (cf Savage and Burrows, 2007, 2009; Burrows 
and Savage, 2014). Social scientists, with the keen methodological focus that characterises their 
field, have been amongst the most critical and reflexive users of social media data (eg boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Housley et al, 2014; Tinati et al, 2014) and this is to their credit. However, 
Wittgenstein’s OLP – chiefly, his antipathy towards the academy’s objectifying of everyday 
language – provides ample justification for us to have to reconsider how we use social media 
data in our attempts to understand the lives of those that generate them. We argue that this is 
linked to notion that the social sciences (and by extension, social media analytics) consist of 
‘second-order’ disciplines which are inevitably one-step removed from the phenomena they 
take as their subject (cf Schutz, 1972). For example, in producing these kinds of (second-order) 
study and in acceding to the dream-myth of objective (social) science that Wittgenstein warns 
20 
 
against, both Heverin and Zach (2012) and Cha et al (2010) miss an opportunity to provide deep 
descriptions of the activities and phenomena they purport to investigate. Such descriptions 
might provide a means of reorienting to – being ‘reminded’ of with perspicuous representations 
– how people use language to conduct their social activities on platforms such as Twitter. It is 
precisely these kinds of descriptions that are lacking amongst social media analytics, and which 
Wittgenstein’s OLP encourages us to strive for. 
Concluding Remarks 
Throughout this paper we have elected to make an analogy between the current social media 
analytics zeitgeist and the ontological and epistemological approach of the social sciences that 
Wittgenstein’s OLP situated itself against. We have used this analogy to argue that inasmuch 
as social media analytics provides a motivation to revisit the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of social research, we should also not neglect the opportunity to revisit those bodies 
of work (eg OLP) that critiqued and problematised those foundations first time around. We do 
not claim that it is mistaken to focus on ontology and epistemology as key concerns of the 
developing field – the theoretical/conceptual explanations and methodological approaches of 
the social sciences (enabled by a concern with ontology and epistemology) are incomparably 
adept at such things as motivating social change and activism, providing counter-narratives, 
facilitating critical reflection, and so on. Rather, our two-fold claim is thus. Firstly, it is wrong-
footed to operate as if the particular ontological and epistemological perspectives evident in 
mainstream social media analytics research can provide direct insight into ‘reality’ as it is often 
assumed they do, and researchers must be careful to explore where their insights originate from 
and accordingly what they can be said to reflect. Secondly, OLP stands as a particularly 
antagonistic alternative/non-mainstream approach to social science which has received little 
attention, yet which is worthy of further exploration. 
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What exactly an OLP approach to social media research might look like ‘on the shop floor’ is 
difficult to envisage, given the idiosyncrasies which can be expected to arise in empirical 
studies of this ilk (ie where the interactional context is everything). We have however briefly 
highlighted the works of several researchers (Didžiokaitė et al, 2017; Brown et al, 2013; Brown 
et al, 2015; Licoppe et al, 2016; Reeves and Brown, 2016; Reeves et al, 2015; Rost et al, 2013) 
who attend specifically to the interactional contexts within which digitally-mediated social 
interactions take place. In applying these kinds of ideas to social media analytics specifically, 
what we hope to have established throughout this paper is a sense of the value and the 
requirements of an OLP alternative to mainstream social media analytics, as well as pointing 
the way towards strategies for conducting research in this way. The strategies we hint at are 
intended to encourage researchers to maintain an orientation to what it makes sense to say about 
and with social media, and to seek out the methods by which social media users publicly display 
their sense-making processes through their language-in-context. It is in these ways that the 
order and organisation that is essential to social media (as a form of communicative language-
use) becomes available to researchers. Describing this order and organisation has the potential 
to give social media research deep insight into what people use language-on-social-media to 
do in their lives. 
As a final point: we are reluctant to speak on behalf of Wittgenstein in terms of providing an 
answer to the title of the paper – we can only speculate what he might have had to say about 
social media. Nonetheless, should Wittgenstein have had anything to say at all about the 
subject, we hope that we have reflected how he might have said it in such a way as to allow 
social media researchers to take up the mantle for themselves. 
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Endnotes 
1. This focus on the organisation of social life through everyday interactions is made 
particularly tangible by ethnomethodology (cf Garfinkel, 1967, 2002); itself a field strongly 
influenced by Wittgensteinian philosophy. 
2. We note a parallel between Ordinary Language Philosophy’s motivations to resist the 
‘scientific’ appropriation of everyday language usage and Schutz’ (1972) conception of the 
social sciences as a ‘second-order’ discipline. We return to this idea briefly in later sections. 
3. Wittgenstein’s thinking is split between pre- and post-Tractatus ([1922] 2005) periods, 
reflecting a significant change of direction in his philosophy. We will be drawing on 
Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus philosophy, especially that exhibited in his Philosophical 
Investigations ([1953] 2009). 
4. Such works include: Beer, 2016; Beer and Burrows, 2013; Boellstorff, 2016; Brooker et al, 
2016a; Brooker et al, 2016b; Burrows and Savage, 2014; Cowls and Schroeder, 2015; Edwards 
et al, 2013; Felt, 2016; Gillespie, 2014; Housley et al, 2014; Kennedy, Poell and van Dijck, 
2015; Kitchin, 2014; Kitchin and McArdle, 2016; Lupton, 2016; Marshall, 2012; Murthy, 
2013; Rogers, 2013; Savage and Burrows, 2009; Tinati et al, 2014; Tufekci, 2014; van Dijck, 
2013; Vis, 2013. 
5. Although the two terms are inevitably interrelated, we use the term ontology to refer to the 
study of the nature of reality and epistemology to refer to our methods of finding out about 
reality. The distinction is between ‘What kinds of thing really exist in the world?’ (Hughes and 
Sharrock, 1997: 5) as an ontological question and ‘How is it possible, if it is, for us to gain 
knowledge of the world?’ (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 5) as its epistemological counterpart. 
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6. Other such studies include: Baker and McEnery, 2015; Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015; 
Bronson and Knezevic, 2016; Burnap et al, 2014; Christiaens, 2016; Citron, 2014; Currie et al, 
2016; Lachlan et al, 2014; Markham and Baym, 2009; Vidal et al, 2015; and many more. 
7. These are: 1) the number of followers a user has; 2) the number of retweets their posts garner, 
and; 3) the frequency with which they are mentioned by other users. 
8. It is worth noting that similar critiques have been levied at other areas of social science and 
the social scientific enterprise more generally (eg Button et al, 1995; Button and Sharrock, 
1993; Randall and Sharrock, 2011; Sharrock and Anderson 1984). Our focus on social media 
analytics specifically is motivated by our seeing these issues occurring again in the newly-
emerging field. 
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